Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack

Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack

Author: C. Christine Fair

Georgetown University
October 13, 2009


This chapter examines leader-led Islamist militancy (a.k.a. “jihad”) in Pakistan. Perhaps
unlike some other chapters in this volume, until the post-9/11 period, the Pakistan state raised
and mobilized numerous so-called jihadi groups to secure external as well as internal security

Ashley J. Tellis, a leading expert on South Asian security, wrote on this point that
“In fact, of all the Pakistani- sponsored Deobandi [sic] terrorist groups operating against India in
Kashmir and elsewhere, only one entity— the Hizbul Mujahedeen— began life as an indigenous
Kashmiri insurgent group; the others, including the most violent organizations such as the
Lashkar- e-Toiba [sic], the Jaish- e- Muhammad, and the Harkat- ul- Mujahedeen, are all led,
manned, and financed by native Pakistanis.”

While it is often believed that Pakistan’s utilization of militants dates to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, in fact Pakistan began doing so in the founding months of the state. Therefore, Pakistan’s militant groups have been active in and from Pakistan for decades and represent a long-standing facet of national power, whose deployment has been increasingly enabled by Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella.

A comprehensive assessment of “leader-led” jihad in Pakistan is beyond the modest length of this present effort. The empirics of the Pakistan comprise a case of state-led jihad as a form of leader-led jihad. Most of the jihadi leaders and groups in Pakistan are themselves – to varying degrees – led, mobilized or supported by the Pakistani state.

Ostensibly, the “leadership” lending strategic guidance and direction to Pakistan’s militant groups is Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and the Pakistan Army. These agencies may be more important than any given individual leader, who serves at the behest of these agencies, because these agencies provide important resources for arming, recruiting, training and ultimately conducting operations.

This chapter will focus upon one of the most lethal and effective militant group operating from Pakistan: the Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT. (LeT regrouped under the name of Jamaat-ul-Dawa when LeT was banned in 2002. For this reason, after 2002, I use the terms JuD and LeT interchangeably). Because LeT differs substantially from other groups operating in Pakistan, this chapter first briefly lays out the key features of the contemporary militant landscape in Pakistan.

Next, this chapter provides key details about the organization and leadership. Third and most important, this chapter provides an account of what is perhaps LeT’s most audacious attack to date: the November 26, 2008 coordinated attack on numerous targets throughout Mumbai, which lasted some 60 hours and killed 172 people while receiving full media coverage on Indian and international media. The chapter concludes with a discussion the policy implications that emerge from this analysis.

Suggested Citation:

Fair, C. Christine, Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-E-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack (October 13, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1753767 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1753767 

Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?

Authored by Eric Rosand and Emily Winterbotham

Published by : www.brookings.edu

Particularly since the rise of the so-called Islamic State in 2013, one of the most widely held theories in international political and policymaker circles has been that a “twisted” or “radical” violent ideology, informed by a perverse interpretation of Islam, lies at the root of the rise in recruitment and radicalization to extremist groups. The logic that follows is: If you eradicate or defeat this ideology, there will be a corresponding drop in the violent extremist threat. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are among the most ardent advocates of this theory, and the understanding underpins the 2018 U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

The solution governments tout has frequently focused on getting political and so-called moderate religious leaders to denounce this ideology; identifying “authentic” voices in local communities—typically women, youth, or other community leaders, or better yet, former extremists—“to help dissuade a young person from finding that ideology appealing.” This is accompanied by training these individuals or groups on how to develop and disseminate these “counter-messages.” Regional counter-messaging centers have even been established around the world to build the capacity of locally-rooted civil society actors to produce and propagate tailored narratives that can push back against the violent ones being peddled by violent extremist groups, and to tackle online radicalization.

“Counter-narratives,” “alternative narratives,” and other “counter-messaging” efforts continue to have global appeal among donors, particularly in the face of the so-called Islamic State’s sophisticated media capabilities and dissemination of slick digital content to accelerate recruitment. Examples of such well-intended initiatives include the French government’s launch of the #stopviolentJihadisme social media campaign, which specifically challenged narratives aimed at women, and featured the release of a shock video campaign to try to discourage French youth from traveling to the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, by telling them: “You’ll find hell on earth and you’ll die alone, far from home.” The Peer-2-Peer Challenging Extremism Program launched by the U.S. government in 2015 (and now a public-private partnership with Facebook) supports efforts of college students around the globe to develop social media tools and online campaigns to counter violent extremist narratives. However, as one expert has rightly noted, “[e]ven if one were to accept the premise that these initiatives provide a compelling counter-narrative, it’s uncertain how such initiatives are even meant to reach the target audience.” In fact, even if they reach the target audience, there is no guarantee that these narratives are, in fact, compelling. Moreover, “why would a ‘vulnerable’ individual engage with such apps or websites and how can we be certain that they are even aware of them to begin with?” As our research has shown, many of these efforts have been driven by political considerations (including a preference for short-term measures and an aversion to risk), the desire to be seen to be doing something (particularly something that does not implicate the behavior of the state), or untested and, in some cases, erroneous assumptions.

The evidence please?

Despite their popularity, there is little proof that counter-narratives in isolation are effective in reducing the threat of violent extremism. It remains far from clear that counter-narrative projects and programs are informed by contextual research or even designed with local input to increase the chances that content will resonate in the very communities they are meant to influence. Meanwhile, the field has a propensity to focus overtly on online radicalization and ignore the significance of offline contact in the radicalization process. This is to not to deny the fact that the internet can be a key enabling factor in establishing and fostering the development of radicalisation, as underscored in recent studies focused on right-wing extremism. However, available research does not suggest that online terrorist propaganda is a causative factor in extremist violence and it questions the relationship between ideas and behaviors.

The field has therefore been subject to criticism. A recent European Parliament study on counter-narratives concluded that “the concept itself is rather underdeveloped and lacks a thorough grounding in empirical research.” Expanding on this, our colleague Andrew Glazzard writes that many existing counter-narrative programs rely on shaky metrics and sparse empirical foundations, lack a fully articulated theory to underpin their impact, and often fail to differentiate between radicalization and recruitment to violence.

Reviewing the existing evidence base in 2016, one expert challenged the prevailing assumptions that the consumption of violent words leads to violent deeds, counter-narratives can replace terrorist narratives, and the threat of violent extremism can be mitigated through discourse. Research does indicate that certain patterns of communication, including hate speech, dehumanization, and identity-based messaging can help create conditions conducive for violent extremism; however, they are not analogous and any causal relationship remains unproven. Responding to each set of violent extremist narratives and its intended audience with a specifically designed counter-narrative fails to address why violent extremist rhetoric is “appealing in the first place.” Advocating retaliatory communications-based responses may therefore “underplay” the significance of identity, grievance, and trust in radicalization processes, and risk a superficial response that addresses the symptoms rather than the causes of violent extremism.

Despite this and other skepticism surrounding the efficacy of the use of counter-narratives in countering extremist violence, it has not led to any decline in their use. In fact, the opposite seems to be true.

Why the appeal?

Among the reasons for the continued global popularity of counter-narrative initiatives—and the need to empower credible voices—is that it allows the focus to remain on the behavior and ideology of the violent extremists and not on the predatory and other counter-productive behavior of governments towards their citizens and the grievance-generating structural issues in a society. This helps explain why 74 countries in the global coalition have perhaps over focused on “countering Daesh’s propaganda” (Daesh is the Arabic acronym for ISIS)—in order “to oppose Daesh’s narrative and to undermine the appeal of its ideology… [and] to assist[and amplify] credible and authentic voices from the region.”

Other reasons for the over-emphasis on counter-narrative and counter-messaging work more broadly relate to the fact that it is often more concrete and short-term in nature, and perceived as being more easily measurable than initiatives focused on addressing grievances or otherwise changing conditions on the ground. However, these metrics tend to focus exclusively on output-level data collating audience figures and immediate commentary or responses to media content, rather than diagnosing any substantive change in, for example, an individual’s propensity or preference for violence. These evaluations are almost impossible to generalize and offer little analysis on the effectiveness of projects beyond fairly superficial benchmarks.

The challenge?

The desire to demonstrate action has awarded unwarranted attention to the counter-narrative field often at the expense of serious consideration for how human rights violations—often committed in the name of countering terrorism and violent extremism—and local governance failures, for example, are fueling violent extremism.

The good news is that donors have doubled-down on investments in research on what drives and mitigates violent extremist threats; thus our understanding of the causes of extremist violence and evidence base of what works and doesn’t continues to improve. In fact, despite the above criticisms, there are ongoing valiant efforts—though unfortunately mostly unattributed and unpublicized—by some institutions to develop clear monitoring measurements and robust indicators of success beyond the production of output level data. There is also a growing recognition of the potential effectiveness of combining counter-narrative activities with other preventive processes. These include one-to-one mentoring, the provision of psycho-social care, or the development of critical thinking skills. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there is a growing understanding, particularly among researchers and practitioners, that “successful” counter-narratives are dependent on a variety of factors. It is important to construct a compelling alternative and present peaceful visions that resonate with local people, as well as restrict the online space for extremist narratives to flourish. At the same time, policymakers must acknowledge the backdrop of often unaddressed socio-economic and political factors, which were responsible for the rise of violent extremism in the first place.

The bad news is that while we are hopeful the ongoing research will lead to more effective counter-narrative projects, we are more pessimistic when it comes to addressing these underlying structural factors, which the research has identified. There, what’s needed is changes in the behavior of the governments whose military, law enforcement, and intelligence cooperation has been central to killing and capturing terrorists. So long as preserving and even strengthening this security cooperation remains the overwhelming priority, the obstacles to incentivizing the necessary behavioral changes will remain high, and counter-narratives will likely continue to receive undue attention.

The Caliphate’s Women and Children – What Role can the Family Courts play? (Part 1)

Publication by Dr. Rumyana van Ark for International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT-Hague)


On 10 June, twelve French and two Dutch orphans of Islamic State fighters were repatriated from Syria to France. This followed the earlier repatriation of five orphans from Syria to France in mid-March of this year; a three year old girl whose mother was sentenced to life imprisonment in Iraq was also returned to France at this time. NorwayBelgium, and Australia have similarly followed suit. These are welcome developments after months (and years) of discernible reluctance by European states to facilitate the return of their citizens from Syria. Yet, thousands more women and children remain stranded in camps across Syria. Children with one or both parents still alive continue to face a perilous and uncertain future in these camps.

As the response to Shamima Begum’s dashed hopes of return to the United Kingdom (UK) aptly illustrates, public opinion remains hostile towards the prospect of the Caliphate’s men and women returning to their respective European countries. The rather cautious step of repatriating the “particularly vulnerable” orphaned children is a positive sign. Yet the questions of whether and how women and their children currently stranded in Syria should be repatriated remains. If states do begin repatriating women and their children more systematically, an array of additional questions arise: do these women pose a threat to national security? Could they be helpful in understanding the process of radicalisation? What has the impact on the children been? While these and other questions relating to the societal impact of returning women and children have been discussed at length, the role domestic family courts can play deserves more attention. The discourse surrounding the Caliphate’s women and children has been dominated by national security risk/threat considerations even when the well-being of a new-born child was at stake. Family law and family courts, regardless of the jurisdiction or circumstances, focus on the children, their families and what is in their best interests to preserve physical and mental welfare.

Family court decisions can be difficult to access, if at all, due to the sensitive nature of the issues involved. Nevertheless, the UK’s High Court Family Division has published, with redactions and abridgements, some decisions assessing potentially radicalised children and the possible risks posed by radicalised parents. The cases have ranged from children radicalised at home to children en route to Syria to children taken to Syria, with each case decided on its own merits. As such, there is no one overarching approach but rather a complex set of choices driven by a number of factors including the age of the child/children, the role played by a parent/parents, and the existing home environment and the possibility for de-radicalisation. At the core of each decision made by the Family Division have been the best interests and ongoing welfare of the child/children. So far, at least 150 to 160 similar cases have already been adjudicated on in the UK. The number is expected to rise as more and more women and children make their way back into the UK.

There are no publicly available statistics to suggest that the relevant courts in countries such as the Netherlands, France, and Belgium have dealt with a similar number of cases or adopted such a broad range of protective measures. From this perspective, the UK’s High Court Family Division could be seen as a trend-setter. Naturally, due to the differences in legal frameworks, family courts in other countries may not be able to adopt the same type of measures or proceed with similar interventions. Ultimately, however, all family courts are driven by the same core principles—the best interests of children and the protection of their physical and mental welfare. As the harm of radicalisation for children and radicalised parents is a new and rather challenging issue facing family courts across Europe, examining the fast-developing jurisprudence of the UK can be instructive. What the following discussion thus proposes to do is examine the more striking cases in order to illustrate the range of measures and interventions supported by the UK family courts in respect of returning and/or radicalised women and children.

Children radicalised at home

Before proceeding with an examination of the various cases, it is important to note a common thread among them—the role played by the respective . Under the Children Act 1989 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Local Authorities in the UK have dual duties. The former impose a general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need. The latter obligations, which are quite specific to the UK, require the Local Authorities to have “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. In other words, Local Authorities have a statutory role and responsibility in countering terrorism and helping protect vulnerable individuals from the risk of radicalisation. As illustrated by the cases below, the relevant Local Authorities have shown a strong commitment to their dual duties with swift and decisive actions taken in a number of cases. To protect the identities and addresses of the families involved, the names of the children, their parents, and most Local Authorities have been anonymised throughout the openly published decisions.

One of the first cases of its kind to reach the Family Division was London Borough of Tower Hamlets and BIn the first of a trio of cases, B was a sixteen-year-old teenager at the time of the hearing. On 6 December 2014, she was reported missing by her mother who was concerned that B had decided to travel to Syria. The Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command intercepted the flight B was travelling on minutes before it was due to take off and removed her. After she was interviewed, the Local Authority applied to make B a Ward of Court. Under a Warship Order, in broad terms, the High Court becomes the legal guardian of a child. The application was granted and a number of measures were imposed such as use of certain software to monitor B’s online activity; in addition, the parents were asked to surrender both B’s and their passports to their solicitor. While B made no further attempts to travel, on 12 August 2015 her parents and siblings were arrested on suspicion of “possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”—an offence contrary to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

During the second case, the materials found in the house were described as “not merely gratuitously shocking [but also] involving information of practical nature designed to support and to perpetrate terrorist attacks”. Having assessed the family situation, the judge in the case—Hayden J —concluded that B had been subjected to serious emotional harm and, at the very least, remained at risk of such harm in her parents’ care. In other words, her psychological, emotional, and intellectual integrity could not, at present, be protected within the family home. As such, only a safe and neutral environment away from her family would, for the time being, secure her welfare interests. The Local Authority’s proposal to place her in foster care was approved. In reaching this conclusion, Hayden J compared sexual abuse (or violations to the body in general) to the harm of radicalisation (or violations of the mind). He described the latter as every bit insidious and involving harm of similar magnitude and complexion.

In the third case involving B, the court was tasked with assessing whether B should remain separated from her family. The key questions within these proceedings were: had her parents played a role in her radicalisation? Have the other children in the family been radicalised or are they currently at risk? And, how should B’s and her siblings’ welfare be most effectively secured? In respect of the first question, the court found that both parents had played a role in her radicalisation. Hayden J scathingly noted that “none of the family members has given evidence which can be properly characterised as ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth’.” The father, in particular, was deemed to have fundamentally failed to protect his children from viewing the gruesome images. Further, though perhaps he had not fully appreciated it, the father was found to have been complicit in “the corruption of his daughter’s emotional integrity and a corrosive influence on the development of her personal autonomy”. While B had become radicalised, no evidence was found that her siblings had followed her path.

Thus, the final question remained—should B continue to be separated from her family? B was found to still be radicalised and desensitised to human suffering. In using strong and emotive language, Hayden J stated that “having damaged such a crucial part of her core humanity, she must be regarded as a significant risk of harm to herself and others”. However, it was not the court’s role or objective to de-radicalise her but rather offer her the space and stimulation to open her mind to alternative possibilities. As a brief side note, a goal of de-radicalisation is arguably the encouragement of critical thinking allowing for the opening of a mind to alternative possibilities; however, perhaps, the judge in the case wanted to make a distinction between active engagement in de-radicalisation processes (not within the court’s purview) and facilitation of subsequent de-radicalisation activities post judicial proceedings. As for B’s particular situation, due to the complexities of her welfare needs, opportunities for appropriate foster care were practically non-existent. As a consequence, she lived for nine months in very isolated circumstances. During this time, it was not possible to provide her with the level of tuition she required and as a result she abandoned secondary school education.

Thus, the present arrangements were found to neither address the issues B faced nor to meet the range of her welfare needs to a satisfactory degree. The conclusion was to return B to her family home. While this may not seem as the most obvious or logical solution, in the particular circumstances of the case, Hayden J felt that B was most likely to rediscover her own intellectual autonomy in a home environment where she was happy and loved. A number of conditions were imposed on the family in order to facilitate the return—for example, B had to enrol in a local school rather than be home schooled. The mother, who had been described as “very controlling and involved”, was prohibited from attending her children’s Prevent sessions. Further, as emphasised by the court, it was easier for the police and social services to monitor the family if they were together.

Concluding Remarks

A number of important points can be drawn from this trio of cases. While the challenges of radicalisation may be a new facet in child protection, the court demonstrated willingness to act as often as required in order to safeguard the welfare of a child. Quite notably, the court showed extensive concern not just for B herself but also for her siblings and requested wide-ranging fact-finding on the family environment and impact assessment of the parents’ behaviour on all of their children. In each of the three cases, the court carefully considered how the siblings were coping and whether they also required protective measures. In other words, in recognising that the harm of radicalisation can be complex and multifaceted, the court adopted a holistic approach in respect of all siblings. Had there been evidence that one or more of the siblings was radicalised or at risk of radicalisation, the court would have been willing to impose additional protective orders. This should not be seen as judicial activism or too much of an interventionalist approach but rather a sign that the family courts are undeterred by the complexities of cases involving radicalisation and will act if deemed essential and proportionate in order to protect children from harm.

One of the benefits of family court involvement in such cases, is the judicial willingness to review the measures imposed as regularly as considered necessary and make adjustments if appropriate. In all of B’s cases, the facts as presently available were one of the deciding factors in reaching a conclusion. When circumstances dramatically changed and/or the impact of certain protective measures became more concrete, the court was prepared to adapt and adjust the orders imposed on the family. Underlying all of the considerations was the question of what is best for B’s welfare at a particular point of time. In other words, the court took a highly individualised approach towards B to ensure that the harm caused by radicalisation does not leave a more permanent mark. This individualised approach combined with deep sensitivity towards the complexities of radicalisation and appreciation for the importance of family unity, can be seen in cases such as Brighton and Hove City Council and The Mother and Y and A Local Authority and HB (mother) and MB (father) and ML and BL (The Children).

Overall, while direct engagement with de-radicalisation efforts is not within the purview of family courts, they can nevertheless facilitate de-radicalisation efforts post judicial proceedings through the type of child care measures recommended based on the facts of the particular case and the specific welfare needs of a child. In short, the family courts can play a very important role in reducing the risk and harm of radicalisation in respect of children. The subsequent cases involving children en route to Syria and children taken/born in Syria support this view. These cases will be discussed in Part 2.

About the Author


Dr. Rumyana van Ark (née Grozdanova) is a Research Fellow and a Coordinator at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. She is also a Post-Doctoral Researcher in Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and International Law at the T.M.C. Asser Institute within the Research Strand ‘Human Dignity and Human Security’. Her work focuses on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on the individual terror suspect and the long-term implications for the rule of law.

Courtesy ICCT-Hague

Extremist Content Online: Pro-ISIS Group Returns to YouTube

Terror Group Also Releases Videos in Africa; Far Right Extremists Promote Violence on Telegram

(New York, N.Y.) – The Counter Extremism Project (CEP) reports weekly on the methods used by extremists to exploit the Internet and social media platforms to recruit followers and incite violence. This week, CEP identified an ISIS video from War and Media Agency on YouTube. Additionally, the terror group released several videos from Tunisia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and numerous extreme right Telegram channels promoted violence against Jews and politicians.

Pro-ISIS War and Media Agency Account Returns to YouTube

An account for the pro-ISIS media group War and Media Agency was activated on July 12, with one video uploaded that day, and another uploaded on July 16. In an attempt to circumvent YouTube’s Community Guidelines, War and Media Agency content claims to be either a documentary news program or states that the video is for “news and educational purposes only.” The account was removed by YouTube after being online for approximately one week.

“Progress has been made in removing terror groups such as ISIS from mainstream social media platforms, but this upload shows that the work isn’t finished,” said CEP researcher Joshua Fisher-Birch. “ISIS’s supporters savvy usage of online propaganda is on display here, as these YouTube videos adeptly avoid the obvious markers for automatic removal. There are no immediately recognizable on screen graphics and the video contains low quantities of official ISIS content; its affiliation to the terror group was identified through listening to the narration and comparing the channel to previous similar examples. This is why there must always be a human component to content removal policies.”

The videos uploaded in July 2019 contain ISIS propaganda photos and Amaq News statements, as well as images from other sources. As of July 18, one video had 355 views, and the other had 219.

                                              War And Media Agency Video On YouTube, Drive, July 18, 2019

New ISIS Video Released from Tunisia

On July 16, ISIS’s self-proclaimed province in Tunisia released a video from its “The Best Outcome is for the Pious” series. The video includes calls for patience and steadfastness by ISIS members, as well as for attacks against civilians in states belonging to the country’s anti-ISIS coalition, including in tourist areas. It concludes with different groups of fighters in Tunisia reaffirming their allegiance to ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In addition to Telegram, the video was released on at least 26 websites: Google Drive, ownCloud, Sendvid, Mediafire, the Microsoft One Drive, Top4top, Amazon Drive, Anonfile, the Internet Archive, Bayfiles, mail.ru, Dailymotion, file.fm, mega.nz, Megaup, ok.ru, Streamable, transfer.sh, tune.pk, Dalfalk, Dropbox, Vidio, Zippyshare, Myspace, Yadi.sk, and Zupload. Approximately 36 hours later, the video was still available on at least 17 websites: ownCloud, Mediafire, Top4top, Anonfile, the Internet Archive, Bayfiles, mail.ru, file.fm, Megaup, ok.ru, Streamable, transfer.sh, Dalfalk, Vidio, Zippyshare, Myspace, and Zupload.

                                                              “The Best Outcome Is For The Pious” On Vidio, July 18, 2019

ISIS Amaq News Video Released from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

On July 14, ISIS released a video via the Amaq News Agency that allegedly shows the bodies of dead soldiers from the Congolese Army following an attack near the city of Beni in eastern Congo. In addition to Telegram, the video was uploaded to at least 10 websites: Sendvid, Dropbox, Amazon Cloud Drive, Top4top, the Internet Archive, Dailymotion, file.fm, Mega.nz, Streamable, and Tune.pk. Approximately four days later, the video was still available on Amazon Cloud Drive, and Top4top.

Extreme Right Telegram Channels Promote Violence Against Jews, Politicians, Drag Queen Story Hour Events

CEP researchers have located numerous examples of extreme right-wing Telegram channels encouraging violence. One channel with more than 480 subscribers posted an image on July 15 calling for violence using a modified image of a woman wearing a kippah taken from a recent Ohio rally allegedly against immigration raids. Another channel with over 250 subscribers posted a graphic promoting the murder of politicians consisting of bullets with accompanying text reading “Get us close, and send all of us at once. Every single one. We’ll make sure that m*therf*cker NEVER signs another law EVER again.” Another Telegram channel, with over 450 subscribers, posted an image based on a popular meme, urging shooting attacks against libraries hosting Drag Queen Story Hour events. An additional Telegram channel with over 1,000 subscribers posted instructions on building pipe bombs and pressure cooker bombs on July 14.

Courtesy: Counter Extremism Project

Nigerian army says 54 people rescued from Boko Haram

LAGOS, Nigeria – The Nigerian army says it has rescued 54 women and children held captive by the extremist group Boko Haram. A statement issued Monday by military spokesman Sagir Musa says troops rescued the captives during a clearance operation over the weekend in Borno State.

The military spokesman said the rescued persons consist of 29 women and 25 children.

Sagir said Boko Haram fighters had fled the villages before troops arrived.

Boko Haram frequently abducts women and children. The jihadist group began its insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and now has expanded its reach to the neighboring countries of Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

In April 2014, 276 girls were abducted from the Government Secondary School in Chibok. More than 100 of them are still missing five years later.


source: www.foxnews.com

Somalia Car Bomb Near Presidential Palace Kills 4 People

At least four people were killed and scores of others were injured in a bomb explosion at the Warta-Nabada district headquarters in the Somalia capital, Mogadishu, the Horn of Africa nation’s police said.

The car bomb that was set off inside the headquarters also destroyed nearby houses, Abdi Shino, a Somali police officer, said by phone. The al-Shabaab militant group, which is linked to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Warta-Nabada headquarters is located in a heavily guarded neighborhood close to the presidential palace. Tuesday’s attack in Mogadishu is the first during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, when the insurgency traditionally increases attacks.

source: Bloomberg